The height/velocity diagram or unsafe area ?
Diploma > registration
Maximum endurance for a helicopter depends on ?
A helicopter in performance class 3 must be certified in ?
At night operations in performance class 3 helicopters are Is independent of altitude at which helicopter operating. Maximum endurance achieved in unaccelerated level flight with minimum fuel flow the speed to fly maximum endurance the speed at lowest fuel flow per unit of time. 
For take off with a tail wind component in class 2 performance an operator must take account of at least 5 % of reported tail wind component. cat pol h 105 general c) when showing compliance with requirements of this section account shall be taken of following parameters 1) mass of helicopter 2) helicopter configuration 3) environmental conditions in particular i) pressure altitude temperature ii) wind a) except as provided in (c) take off take off flight path landing requirements accountability wind shall be no more than 50% of any reported steady headwind component of 5 kt or more b) where take off landing with a tailwind component permitted in afm in all cases the take off flight path not less than 150% of any reported tailwind component shall be taken into account and c) where precise wind measuring equipment enables accurate measurement of wind velocity over point of take off landing wind components in excess of 50% may be established the operator provided that operator demonstrates to competent authority that proximity to fato accuracy enhancements of wind measuring equipment provide an equivalent level of safety 4) operating techniques and 5) operation of any systems that have an adverse effect on performance. 
When planning one engine inoperative in cruise a helicopter of performance class 2 must be able to maintain a rate of climb of at least 5 ft/min at 2 ft in mountainous areas. cat pol h 105 general c) when showing compliance with requirements of this section account shall be taken of following parameters 1) mass of helicopter 2) helicopter configuration 3) environmental conditions in particular i) pressure altitude temperature ii) wind a) except as provided in (c) take off take off flight path landing requirements accountability wind shall be no more than 50% of any reported steady headwind component of 5 kt or more b) where take off landing with a tailwind component permitted in afm in all cases the take off flight path not less than 150% of any reported tailwind component shall be taken into account and c) where precise wind measuring equipment enables accurate measurement of wind velocity over point of take off landing wind components in excess of 50% may be established the operator provided that operator demonstrates to competent authority that proximity to fato accuracy enhancements of wind measuring equipment provide an equivalent level of safety 4) operating techniques and 5) operation of any systems that have an adverse effect on performance. 
Define term 'performance class 2' Performance class 2 operations are those operations such that in event of critical power unit failure performance available to enable helicopter to safely continue flight except when failure occurs early during take off manoeuvre or late in landing manoeuvre in which cases a forced landing may be required. cat pol h 105 general c) when showing compliance with requirements of this section account shall be taken of following parameters 1) mass of helicopter 2) helicopter configuration 3) environmental conditions in particular i) pressure altitude temperature ii) wind a) except as provided in (c) take off take off flight path landing requirements accountability wind shall be no more than 50% of any reported steady headwind component of 5 kt or more b) where take off landing with a tailwind component permitted in afm in all cases the take off flight path not less than 150% of any reported tailwind component shall be taken into account and c) where precise wind measuring equipment enables accurate measurement of wind velocity over point of take off landing wind components in excess of 50% may be established the operator provided that operator demonstrates to competent authority that proximity to fato accuracy enhancements of wind measuring equipment provide an equivalent level of safety 4) operating techniques and 5) operation of any systems that have an adverse effect on performance. Question 99-8
In class 2 performance with one engine failed and others operating a helicopter's weight at estimated landing time must allow it to climb at least at 5 ft/min at ft above destination the alternate heliports. cat pol h 105 general c) when showing compliance with requirements of this section account shall be taken of following parameters 1) mass of helicopter 2) helicopter configuration 3) environmental conditions in particular i) pressure altitude temperature ii) wind a) except as provided in (c) take off take off flight path landing requirements accountability wind shall be no more than 50% of any reported steady headwind component of 5 kt or more b) where take off landing with a tailwind component permitted in afm in all cases the take off flight path not less than 150% of any reported tailwind component shall be taken into account and c) where precise wind measuring equipment enables accurate measurement of wind velocity over point of take off landing wind components in excess of 50% may be established the operator provided that operator demonstrates to competent authority that proximity to fato accuracy enhancements of wind measuring equipment provide an equivalent level of safety 4) operating techniques and 5) operation of any systems that have an adverse effect on performance. Question 99-9
Performance class 2 helicopters shall have a maximum approved seating configuration of 9 or less but more than 9. cat pol h 105 general c) when showing compliance with requirements of this section account shall be taken of following parameters 1) mass of helicopter 2) helicopter configuration 3) environmental conditions in particular i) pressure altitude temperature ii) wind a) except as provided in (c) take off take off flight path landing requirements accountability wind shall be no more than 50% of any reported steady headwind component of 5 kt or more b) where take off landing with a tailwind component permitted in afm in all cases the take off flight path not less than 150% of any reported tailwind component shall be taken into account and c) where precise wind measuring equipment enables accurate measurement of wind velocity over point of take off landing wind components in excess of 50% may be established the operator provided that operator demonstrates to competent authority that proximity to fato accuracy enhancements of wind measuring equipment provide an equivalent level of safety 4) operating techniques and 5) operation of any systems that have an adverse effect on performance. Question 99-10
In class 1 performance with one engine failed and others operating a helicopter's weight at estimated landing time must allow it to climb at least at 5 ft/min at ft ft/min at 2 ft above destination the alternate heliports. cat pol h 105 general c) when showing compliance with requirements of this section account shall be taken of following parameters 1) mass of helicopter 2) helicopter configuration 3) environmental conditions in particular i) pressure altitude temperature ii) wind a) except as provided in (c) take off take off flight path landing requirements accountability wind shall be no more than 50% of any reported steady headwind component of 5 kt or more b) where take off landing with a tailwind component permitted in afm in all cases the take off flight path not less than 150% of any reported tailwind component shall be taken into account and c) where precise wind measuring equipment enables accurate measurement of wind velocity over point of take off landing wind components in excess of 50% may be established the operator provided that operator demonstrates to competent authority that proximity to fato accuracy enhancements of wind measuring equipment provide an equivalent level of safety 4) operating techniques and 5) operation of any systems that have an adverse effect on performance. Question 99-11
Define term 'performance class 1' Performance class operations are those with performance such that in event of failure of critical power unit helicopter able to land within rejected take off distance available or safely continue flight to an appropriate landing area depending on when failure occurs. cat pol h 105 general c) when showing compliance with requirements of this section account shall be taken of following parameters 1) mass of helicopter 2) helicopter configuration 3) environmental conditions in particular i) pressure altitude temperature ii) wind a) except as provided in (c) take off take off flight path landing requirements accountability wind shall be no more than 50% of any reported steady headwind component of 5 kt or more b) where take off landing with a tailwind component permitted in afm in all cases the take off flight path not less than 150% of any reported tailwind component shall be taken into account and c) where precise wind measuring equipment enables accurate measurement of wind velocity over point of take off landing wind components in excess of 50% may be established the operator provided that operator demonstrates to competent authority that proximity to fato accuracy enhancements of wind measuring equipment provide an equivalent level of safety 4) operating techniques and 5) operation of any systems that have an adverse effect on performance. Question 99-12
A helicopter of performance class 1 must achieve on take off a rate of climb of ft/min at 2 ft. cat pol h 105 general c) when showing compliance with requirements of this section account shall be taken of following parameters 1) mass of helicopter 2) helicopter configuration 3) environmental conditions in particular i) pressure altitude temperature ii) wind a) except as provided in (c) take off take off flight path landing requirements accountability wind shall be no more than 50% of any reported steady headwind component of 5 kt or more b) where take off landing with a tailwind component permitted in afm in all cases the take off flight path not less than 150% of any reported tailwind component shall be taken into account and c) where precise wind measuring equipment enables accurate measurement of wind velocity over point of take off landing wind components in excess of 50% may be established the operator provided that operator demonstrates to competent authority that proximity to fato accuracy enhancements of wind measuring equipment provide an equivalent level of safety 4) operating techniques and 5) operation of any systems that have an adverse effect on performance. Question 99-13
As a cause of accidents human factor Is cited in approximately 7 8 % of aviation accidents. cat pol h 105 general c) when showing compliance with requirements of this section account shall be taken of following parameters 1) mass of helicopter 2) helicopter configuration 3) environmental conditions in particular i) pressure altitude temperature ii) wind a) except as provided in (c) take off take off flight path landing requirements accountability wind shall be no more than 50% of any reported steady headwind component of 5 kt or more b) where take off landing with a tailwind component permitted in afm in all cases the take off flight path not less than 150% of any reported tailwind component shall be taken into account and c) where precise wind measuring equipment enables accurate measurement of wind velocity over point of take off landing wind components in excess of 50% may be established the operator provided that operator demonstrates to competent authority that proximity to fato accuracy enhancements of wind measuring equipment provide an equivalent level of safety 4) operating techniques and 5) operation of any systems that have an adverse effect on performance. Question 99-14
Analysis of accidents involving human factor in aviation shows that There hardly ever a single cause responsible. cat pol h 105 general c) when showing compliance with requirements of this section account shall be taken of following parameters 1) mass of helicopter 2) helicopter configuration 3) environmental conditions in particular i) pressure altitude temperature ii) wind a) except as provided in (c) take off take off flight path landing requirements accountability wind shall be no more than 50% of any reported steady headwind component of 5 kt or more b) where take off landing with a tailwind component permitted in afm in all cases the take off flight path not less than 150% of any reported tailwind component shall be taken into account and c) where precise wind measuring equipment enables accurate measurement of wind velocity over point of take off landing wind components in excess of 50% may be established the operator provided that operator demonstrates to competent authority that proximity to fato accuracy enhancements of wind measuring equipment provide an equivalent level of safety 4) operating techniques and 5) operation of any systems that have an adverse effect on performance. Question 99-15
To avoid wrong decisions the pilot an aircraft system should at least be able to Report its malfunction. When system malfunctions it should report unservicability to pilot the pilot can see what 'deviation' and correct it but he needs to know that it the result of a system malfunction. Question 99-16
When can a system be said to be tolerant to error when The consequences of an error will not seriously jeopardise safety. When system malfunctions it should report unservicability to pilot the pilot can see what 'deviation' and correct it but he needs to know that it the result of a system malfunction. Question 99-17
Why must flight safety considerations consider human error mechanism 1 it analysis of an incident or accident which will make it possible to identify what error has been committed and whom it the process whereby perpetrator made responsible which may lead to elimination of error 2 if we have a better understanding of cognitive error mechanism it will be possible to adapt procedures aircraft interfaces etc 3 it error management procedure which enables us to continuously adjust our actions the better we understand underlying mechanism of an error better will be our means detecting and reducing future errors 4 since error essentially human once it has been identified the use of procedures a person will be able to anticipate and deal with it automatically in future the correct statement s are The consequences of an error will not seriously jeopardise safety. When system malfunctions it should report unservicability to pilot the pilot can see what 'deviation' and correct it but he needs to know that it the result of a system malfunction. Question 99-18
The trend in aeroplane hull loss rate over last three decades seems to be related to The consequences of an error will not seriously jeopardise safety. Human error is far most pervasive contributing factor to accidents incidents in technologically complex systems such as air transportation one major data base of jet transport accidents worldwide indicates that 65 per cent of all such accidents have been attributed to flight crew error it also indicates that the approach landing phases of flight which account 4 per cent of total flight exposure time 49 per cent of all accidents flight crew error cited in 80 per cent of cases as a causal factor other sources of human error including maintenance dispatch and importantly air traffic control account another significant proportion of accidents. Question 99-19
One negative aspect of highly automated cockpit results in Complacency among crewmembers. Human error is far most pervasive contributing factor to accidents incidents in technologically complex systems such as air transportation one major data base of jet transport accidents worldwide indicates that 65 per cent of all such accidents have been attributed to flight crew error it also indicates that the approach landing phases of flight which account 4 per cent of total flight exposure time 49 per cent of all accidents flight crew error cited in 80 per cent of cases as a causal factor other sources of human error including maintenance dispatch and importantly air traffic control account another significant proportion of accidents. Question 99-20
Between which components with reference to shell concept covers pilot misinterpretation of old three point altimeter Complacency among crewmembers. the shell model a conceptual model of human factors that clarifies scope of aviation human factors assists in understanding human factor relationships between aviation system resources/environment (the flying subsystem) the human component in aviation system (the human subsystem) the shell model was first developed edwards (1972) later modified into a 'building block' structure hawkins (1984) the model named after initial letters of its components (software hardware environment liveware) places emphasis on human being human interfaces with other components of aviation system s = software (procedures symbology etc ) h = hardware (machine) e = environment l = liveware (human) in shell model match or mismatch of blocke (interface) just as important as characteristics of blocks themselves a mismatch can be a source of human error liveware hardware (l h) interaction between human operator machine involves matching physical features of aircraft cockpit or equipment with general characteristics of human users while considering task or job to be performed examples designing passenger crew seats to fit sitting characteristics of human body designing cockpit displays controls to match sensory information processing movement characteristics of human users while facilitating action sequencing minimising workload (through location/layout) including safeguards incorrect/inadvertent operation mismatches at l h interface may occur through poorly designed equipment inappropriate or missing operational material badly located or coded instruments control devices warning systems that fail in alerting informational or guidance functions in abnormal situations etc the old 3 pointer aircraft altimeter encouraged errors because it was very difficult pilots to tell what information related to which pointer. Question 99-21
The errors resulting from an illogical indexing system in an operations manual are related to an interface mismatch between Complacency among crewmembers. the shell model a conceptual model of human factors that clarifies scope of aviation human factors assists in understanding human factor relationships between aviation system resources/environment (the flying subsystem) the human component in aviation system (the human subsystem) the shell model was first developed edwards (1972) later modified into a 'building block' structure hawkins (1984) the model named after initial letters of its components (software hardware environment liveware) places emphasis on human being human interfaces with other components of aviation system s = software (procedures symbology etc ) h = hardware (machine) e = environment l = liveware (human) in shell model match or mismatch of blocke (interface) just as important as characteristics of blocks themselves a mismatch can be a source of human error liveware hardware (l h) interaction between human operator machine involves matching physical features of aircraft cockpit or equipment with general characteristics of human users while considering task or job to be performed examples designing passenger crew seats to fit sitting characteristics of human body designing cockpit displays controls to match sensory information processing movement characteristics of human users while facilitating action sequencing minimising workload (through location/layout) including safeguards incorrect/inadvertent operation mismatches at l h interface may occur through poorly designed equipment inappropriate or missing operational material badly located or coded instruments control devices warning systems that fail in alerting informational or guidance functions in abnormal situations etc the old 3 pointer aircraft altimeter encouraged errors because it was very difficult pilots to tell what information related to which pointer. Question 99-22
Organisational factors which affect or may have some influence on human error are 1 malfunction of technical systems2 fuel saving policies3 rostering4 weather phenomenawhich of following lists all correct answers Complacency among crewmembers. malfunction of technical systems weather are not organisational factors a complex fuel saving policies can lead to errors a bad rostering may lead to fatigue which can lead to errors. Question 99-23
The causes of human error can be abundant and complex which of following factors could contribute to human error 1 personality 2 motivation and attitudes 3 emotional state 4 external environmental factors which of following lists all of correct factors Complacency among crewmembers. malfunction of technical systems weather are not organisational factors a complex fuel saving policies can lead to errors a bad rostering may lead to fatigue which can lead to errors. Question 99-24
The errors of a motor programme are Action slip environmental capture (habituation). motor programmes if a task performed often enough it may eventually become automatic the required skills actions are stored in long term memory these are known as motor programmes are ingrained routines that have been established through practice the use of a motor programme reduces load on central decision maker an often quoted example that of driving a car at first each individual action such as gear changing demanding but eventually separate actions are combined into a motor programme can be performed with little or no awareness these motor programmes allow us to carry out simultaneous activities such as having a conversation whilst driving action slips as name implies are same as slips i e an action not carried out as intended the example given below may consist of a pilot intending to key in fl110 into fms but keying in fl100 mistake after having been distracted a query from his co pilot img /com_en/com040 592 jpg environmental capture may occur when a pilot carries out a certain task very frequently in a certain location thus a pilot used to reaching a certain switch to select function a on an airbus a320 may inadvertently select same switch on an airbus 321 when in fact it has a different function. Question 99-25
With reference to shell model s represents Software (which includes check lists). motor programmes if a task performed often enough it may eventually become automatic the required skills actions are stored in long term memory these are known as motor programmes are ingrained routines that have been established through practice the use of a motor programme reduces load on central decision maker an often quoted example that of driving a car at first each individual action such as gear changing demanding but eventually separate actions are combined into a motor programme can be performed with little or no awareness these motor programmes allow us to carry out simultaneous activities such as having a conversation whilst driving action slips as name implies are same as slips i e an action not carried out as intended the example given below may consist of a pilot intending to key in fl110 into fms but keying in fl100 mistake after having been distracted a query from his co pilot img /com_en/com040 592 jpg environmental capture may occur when a pilot carries out a certain task very frequently in a certain location thus a pilot used to reaching a certain switch to select function a on an airbus a320 may inadvertently select same switch on an airbus 321 when in fact it has a different function. Question 99-26
Who in aviation industry responsible flight safety Software (which includes check lists). motor programmes if a task performed often enough it may eventually become automatic the required skills actions are stored in long term memory these are known as motor programmes are ingrained routines that have been established through practice the use of a motor programme reduces load on central decision maker an often quoted example that of driving a car at first each individual action such as gear changing demanding but eventually separate actions are combined into a motor programme can be performed with little or no awareness these motor programmes allow us to carry out simultaneous activities such as having a conversation whilst driving action slips as name implies are same as slips i e an action not carried out as intended the example given below may consist of a pilot intending to key in fl110 into fms but keying in fl100 mistake after having been distracted a query from his co pilot img /com_en/com040 592 jpg environmental capture may occur when a pilot carries out a certain task very frequently in a certain location thus a pilot used to reaching a certain switch to select function a on an airbus a320 may inadvertently select same switch on an airbus 321 when in fact it has a different function. Question 99-27
Ergonomics are associated with The human/workplace interface. motor programmes if a task performed often enough it may eventually become automatic the required skills actions are stored in long term memory these are known as motor programmes are ingrained routines that have been established through practice the use of a motor programme reduces load on central decision maker an often quoted example that of driving a car at first each individual action such as gear changing demanding but eventually separate actions are combined into a motor programme can be performed with little or no awareness these motor programmes allow us to carry out simultaneous activities such as having a conversation whilst driving action slips as name implies are same as slips i e an action not carried out as intended the example given below may consist of a pilot intending to key in fl110 into fms but keying in fl100 mistake after having been distracted a query from his co pilot img /com_en/com040 592 jpg environmental capture may occur when a pilot carries out a certain task very frequently in a certain location thus a pilot used to reaching a certain switch to select function a on an airbus a320 may inadvertently select same switch on an airbus 321 when in fact it has a different function. Question 99-28
Which of following human error rates can be described and pretty good realistic and pretty good after methodical training The human/workplace interface. after a methodical training human error rates can be less than 1 in 1000 without training methodology error rate can be as high as 1 in 100. Question 99-29
Which of following concepts relating to human reliability true If equipment designed in such a way that it can be operated wrongly then sooner or later it will be. after a methodical training human error rates can be less than 1 in 1000 without training methodology error rate can be as high as 1 in 100. Question 99-30
What the current approach to human error Realisation that humans are fallible that systems procedures should be designed to minimise human error. human factors as a term has to be clearly defined because when these words are used in vernacular they are often applied to any factor related to humans the human element the most flexible adaptable valuable part of aviation system but it also most vulnerable to influences which can adversely affect its performance throughout years some three out of four accidents have resulted from less than optimum human performance this has commonly been classified as human error the term 'human error' of no help in accident prevention because although it may indicate where in system a breakdown occurs it provides no guidance as to why it occurs an error attributed to humans in system may have been design induced or stimulated inadequate training badly designed procedures or poor concept or layout of checklists or manuals further term 'human error' allows concealment of underlying factors which must be brought to fore if accidents are to be prevented in fact contemporary safety thinking argues that human error should be starting point rather than stop rule in accident investigation prevention to contain control human error one must first understand its nature there are basic concepts associated with nature of human error origins of errors can be fundamentally different the consequences of similar errors can also be significantly different while some errors are due to carelessness negligence or poor judgement others may be induced poorly designed equipment or may result from a normal reaction of a person to a particular situation the latter kind of error likely to be repeated its occurrence can be anticipated. Question 99-31
Human error rates during performance of a simple and repetitive task can normally be expected to be approximately Realisation that humans are fallible that systems procedures should be designed to minimise human error. human factors as a term has to be clearly defined because when these words are used in vernacular they are often applied to any factor related to humans the human element the most flexible adaptable valuable part of aviation system but it also most vulnerable to influences which can adversely affect its performance throughout years some three out of four accidents have resulted from less than optimum human performance this has commonly been classified as human error the term 'human error' of no help in accident prevention because although it may indicate where in system a breakdown occurs it provides no guidance as to why it occurs an error attributed to humans in system may have been design induced or stimulated inadequate training badly designed procedures or poor concept or layout of checklists or manuals further term 'human error' allows concealment of underlying factors which must be brought to fore if accidents are to be prevented in fact contemporary safety thinking argues that human error should be starting point rather than stop rule in accident investigation prevention to contain control human error one must first understand its nature there are basic concepts associated with nature of human error origins of errors can be fundamentally different the consequences of similar errors can also be significantly different while some errors are due to carelessness negligence or poor judgement others may be induced poorly designed equipment or may result from a normal reaction of a person to a particular situation the latter kind of error likely to be repeated its occurrence can be anticipated. Question 99-32
If one error allowed to effect a whole system system described as Realisation that humans are fallible that systems procedures should be designed to minimise human error. the entire system can collapse due to this error. Question 99-33
In 1972 a psychologist named edwards presented a concept of interface between flight crew and other parts of airspace environment what this concept called and names of those elements involved The shell concept software hardware environment liveware. the entire system can collapse due to this error. Question 99-34
What are main advantages of human over machine Creativity innovation aptitude to deal with novel situations. the entire system can collapse due to this error. Question 99-35
What role should automation play with respect to flight safety Automation should be used as an aid to pilot not as an end in itself. the entire system can collapse due to this error. Question 99-36
The most significant item of technical equipment introduced in 1980s and 1990s which has contributed to a reduction in accidents Automation should be used as an aid to pilot not as an end in itself. the entire system can collapse due to this error. Question 99-37
Which of following list are factors necessary the promotion of good quality training 1 quality of instruction2 motivation3 knowledge of results feedback 4 a large amount of reference material5 no time restrictions Automation should be used as an aid to pilot not as an end in itself. the entire system can collapse due to this error. Question 99-38
In an organisation where good safety culture predominant accountability rests largely with Automation should be used as an aid to pilot not as an end in itself. the entire system can collapse due to this error. Question 99-39
Civil aviation generally recognized being An open culture activity. the entire system can collapse due to this error. Question 99-40
Fill in missing words in following statements safety culture of national culture An open culture activity. the entire system can collapse due to this error.
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